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III. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Petitioner's jurisdictional statement and statement of 
the issues are fully set forth in his original brief, and need not 
be restated here. Petitioner does not agree with Respondent's 
characterization of the issues, but simply stands on his own 
original statement. 
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IV. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
Respondent's discussion of the manner in which the 
accident occurred, including Dalton not wearing a helmet, and his 
discussion of Dalton's incarceration are not directly relevant 
here. These matters were not before the jury, and have no bearing 
on this appeal, which involves only the issue of damages. 
Respondent's effort to inject into this proceeding the fact, chat 
no evidence was presented as to Dalton's opportunity for medical 
care while incarcerated, likewise has no part in this proceeding. 
Had Respondent wished to place those facts before the jury, he 
should not have stipulated otherwise (C.R. 373). Petitioner is 
also constrained to note that much of this material is not 
supported by citation to the record. 
Respondent does provide a reasonably accurate 
description of the manner in which the Appellate Court's opinion 
bootstraps the standard of review issue (Resp. Br., p. 4). By 
creating a threshold issue of law (the power to consider an 
additur), which just happens to be decided by a non-deferencial 
review of the evidence, the Appellate Court circumvents the 
intermediate action of the trial court and accords it no deference. 
This amounts to a standard of review, under which the Appellate 
Court first reviews the evidence de novo in order to determine if 
a deferential review is warranted. 
Respondent emphasizes that Petitioner has raised a new 
issue in his brief before this Court, as if this was done covertly. 
Petitioner expressly admitted, that " [t]his issue was not presented 
to the Court of Appeals," and cited authorities supporting its 
consideration at this time. (Pet. Br., p. 21). Respondent's 
refusal to even address this issue should be at his own peril. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Again, much of Respondent's statement has no bearing 
on this matter, particularly facts regarding the details of the 
accident. Additionally, Respondent's speculation as to how the 
jury might have arrived at a special damages award of $3,000 is not 
fact, but pure conjecture (Resp. Br., p. 10). In similar fashion, 
Respondent's so-called "facts" concerning mitigation depend largely 
upon interpretation, rather than evidence. Indeed, it is based 
primarily upon Respondent's interpretation of medical records, 
rather than the testimony presented by the physicians who appeared 
at trial. As noted, only three such physicians testified (Pet. 
Br., p. 5). This evidence as to Dalton's need for future medical 
care was uncontroverted (App. Ex. 4, p. 3; Pet. Br., pp. 6-7> .1 
Citations to the Appendix are to the Appendix attached to 
Petitioner's original brief. 
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The relevant facts involve Daltcn's injuries and the 
need for, and cost of, future treatment. In this regard, he 
sustained: multiple fractures to the right maxillary antra area; a 
blow out fracture of the floor cf the right orbit; a tripod 
fracture, nasal fracture, and tooth fracture; a dislocated 
meniscus; temporomandibular joint dysfunction; facial nerve damage 
with numbness; diplopia - blurry vision; flattened right maxilla; 
and, arm, shoulder, hand and knee injuries (C.R. 652-62, 750-82, 
832-36, 874-75, 881, 886). Even Respondent's expert agreed that 
Dalton was 4% disabled (C.R. 897; Tower., Ex. 10). 
Dalton's first expert, Dr. Hodnett, testified that 
Dalton would require an osteotomy (rebreaking of the jaw bones) at 
a cost of $15,000 (C.R. 783-84). Dalton's second expert, Dr. Vaun 
Mikesell, testified as to the need for additional surgery, an 
arthroplasty, at a cost of $7,000 to $11,500, and a bridge at a 
cost of $1,200 to $1,300 (C.R. 824, 836-37, 841). Respondent's 
expert offered no testimony relating to the cost of, or the need 
for, these surgeries. He testified only that Dalton would not 
require future surgery for facial nerve damage, which was not an 
item included in the additur (C.R. 573, 874-76). In allowing the 
additur, the trial court did not include any items other than those 
which were uncontested. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT A 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY 
SUPPORT FOR THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
UTILIZED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The issue of what standard of review applies to an 
additur is one of first impressions in Utah. Whereas Petitioner 
has cited cases from other jurisdictions, which are squarely in 
point, Respondent has no support for the Appellate Court's non-
deferential standard. These authorities are consistent with Utah 
law. Because additur is an alternative to a new trial, it must be 
reviewed under the same abuse-of-discretion standard. See Ryn, 
Inc. v. Platte County Memorial Hospital, 842 P.2d 1084, 1086-87 
(Wyo. 1992); Hazelwood v. Harrah's, 862 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Nev. 
1993); Donaldson v. Anderson, 862 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Nev. 1993); 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); 
Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730; 734 (Utah 1982). 
POINT B 
RESPONDENT FAILS TO ARTICULATE ANY 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHEN ORAL 
ARGUMENT MAY BE DENIED. 
Oral argument is an important part of the appellate 
process, and should not be arbitrarily denied. Respondent has 
failed to provide any reasonable standard by which the denial of 
oral argument here could be justified. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT A 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY 
SUPPORT FOR THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
UTILIZED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
Respondent devotes little attention here to the real 
issue -- namely, the proper standard of appellate review for an 
additur. He prefers, instead, a philosophical discussion of the 
right to a trial by jury and an overview of his version of the 
facts. 
What Respondent does say with regard to standard of 
review is inaccurate, albeit illustrative of the legal controversy 
here. An additur does not replace the jury's verdict with the 
court's own judgment (Resp. Br., p. 12). Rather, it accords the 
party, against whom a new trial has been granted, an option by 
which he might avoid that additional time and expense by agreeing 
to an adjustment. See Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P. 2d 730, 734 (Utah 
1982) . It is the optional nature of an additur and its express 
nexus to an order for a new trial, which compels that it be 
reviewed under the standard applied to motions for a new trial. It 
is not, as Respondent would contend, like a j.n.o.v. or directed 
verdict because there is no mandatory displacement of the jury's 
verdict with the court's judgment. There is, as with a new trial, 
a rejection of that verdict -- but it is not replaced with the 
5 
court's judgment unless the defendant rejects the option of a new 
trial. 
Each party relies upon a differing interpretation of 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) and 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), although neither case 
is squarely in point. Indeed, it is safe to say that this issue is 
one of first impression in Utah. In this regard, Petitioner has 
cited cases from other jurisdictions which are squarely in point, 
and expressly hold that the proper standard for appellate review of 
additurs and remittiturs is abuse of discretion. See Ryn, Inc. v. 
Platte County Memorial Hospital, 842 P.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Wyo. 
1992); Hazelwood v. Harrah's, 862 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Nev. 1993); 
Donaldson v. Anderson, 862 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Nev. 1993) . Respondent 
does not even address these cases. Nor does he cite any case from 
any jurisdiction applying a non-deferential standard of review to 
an additur or remittitur. In the absence of controlling Utah 
authority, the cases cited by Petitioner should be extremely 
persuasive, particularly given that they are consistent with Utah's 
established standards of review. These cases recognize the 
principal upon which Petitioner relies -- that an additur is 
related to a motion for new trial, and should be reviewed under the 
standard applicable to new trial motions. In Utah, that is abuse-
of-discretion. See Nelson, 657 P.2d at 731-33; Goddard v. Hickman, 
685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). 
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Additionally, Respondent does not refute Petitioner's 
argument that the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard 
compels affirming the additur. Accordingly, there should be no 
need to have the Appellate Court redecide the case. Rather, it 
should be reversed outright. 
Respondent's extensive reliance upon what the jury 
might have been thinking in awarding $3,000 in special damages is 
speculative and irrelevant. It rests, primarily, upon the equally 
speculative conclusion that Dalton failed to mitigate his damages. 
It is, apparently, Respondent's position, that Dalton could have 
obviated the need for massive reconstructive surgery by brushing 
his teeth on a more regular basis. Beyond that, Respondent 
mischaracterizes Dr. Stadler's testimony by asserting that he 
opined "that no future surgery would be necessary or helpful." 
(Resp. Br., p. 14) (emphasis added) . Rather, Dr. Stadler2 testified 
only that there was no need for future surgery for facial nerve 
damage -- a much narrower proposition (C.R. 573, 874076) . Once Dr. 
Stadler's opinion is properly confined, Respondent's reliance upon 
the bare fact that Dalton obtained no treatment is reduced to pure 
conjecture. Giving Respondent's characterization even some 
credibility (which is more than is warranted) , it establishes at 
most that the evidence was conflicting. Indeed, this is the most 
2Dr. Stadler conceded he is not a surgeon and does not do 
surgery. 
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that the Court of Appeals would say, and even it did not hold that 
the evidence in Respondent's favor was overwhelming (App. 1, p. 2) . 
Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, conflicting evidence compels 
affirming the trial court. See Goddard, 685 P.2d at 534.3 
Finally, as noted above, there is no support for the 
Appellate Court's application of some threshold test, under which 
it determines whether or not the trial court was empowered to 
consider an additur. The whole premise of this defies logic. The 
Appellate Court calls this an issue of law, thus justifying de novo 
review. Yet, it resolves this issue by substituting its view of 
the evidence for that of the trial court. This is contrary to 
well-established principles, that the trial court is in a better 
position than an appellate court to decide such questions. See 
State Road Comm'n v. Kendell, 438 P.2d 178 (Utah 1968). It also 
accords no recognition to the intermediate action of the trial 
court. In the final analysis, such reasoning could open the door 
to de novo review of any matter, because any issue decided by a 
trial court must depend, in part, upon its power under the law to 
consider the matter. 
3The very severity of Dalton's injuries suggests that the 
trial court's judgment should have been affirmed, even if a more 
exacting standard is proper (which it is not) . It is difficult to 
comprehend how such a terribly injured face could be repaired for 
a mere $3,000. 
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POINT B 
RESPONDENT FAILS TO ARTICULATE ANY 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHEN ORAL 
ARGUMENT MAY BE DENIED. 
Oral argument is a regular part of the appellate 
process, and should not be withheld without some basis for doing 
so. Respondent provides no such standard. Respondent's argument 
regarding oral argument fails to address the points raised by-
Petitioner. Once again, Respondent avoids the issue of what 
standards should apply in favor of an assertion of his opinion, 
that Petitioner's position was adequately presented in his briefs 
before the Court of Appeals. 
Respondent's suggestion that Petitioner some how 
failed to marshall the evidence is absurd. In the Court of 
Appeals, Petitioner was defending the trial court's order and 
judgment, not attacking the jury's verdict. Here, Petitioner is 
challenging the standard of review applied by the Court of Appeals, 
which likewise involves no need to establish that the verdict was 
contrary to the evidence. The Court of Appeals has already found 
the evidence to be conflicting, which is all that Petitioner needs 
under a proper standard. Although it is difficult to comprehend 
what this has to do with oral argument, Petitioner had no 
obligation to marshall the evidence. 
9 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has presented a well supported argument on 
the central issues here -- the proper standard of appellate review. 
Respondent has failed to provide any basis in support of the 
standard applied by the Court of Appeals and, instead, relies upon 
a subjective characterization of the evidence. The issue is not 
whether there is some version of the facts which might support the 
jury's verdict. The issue is whether or not the trial court abused 
its discretion in conditioning denial of a motion for new trial 
upon an additur. It did not, and its judgment should have been 
affirmed. Respondent elected not to accept the new trial offered 
by the trial court. Instead, the Respondent accepted the additur 
and then appealed. Respondent waived his right to appeal by 
accepting the additur as opposed to the new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (Tn day of sJ><J-<^ , 
1996. 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
BY: , 
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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